Tag Archives: criminal appeals

RICO Racketeering Conspiracy: How Specific Must a Jury’s Verdict be? No Need To Name Racketeering Acts Says The First Circuit.

United States v. Leoner-Aguirre
No. 18-1333
First Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided: September 20, 2019

ISSUE

Withdrawing From a Racketeering Conspiracy: Incarceration Doesn’t Count

  • Whether the incarceration of a defendant constitutes a withdrawal from a RICO conspiracy.

HOLDING

  • The Court held that the jury is not required to state in its verdict which specific racketeering acts the defendant committed. The Court relied on Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), which overruled United States v. Ramirez-Rivera 800 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, while there was a long list of alleged acts that Mr. Aguirre was accused of such as murder, attempted murder, robbery etc. It was not necessary for the jury to specify which acts they found the defendant to have committed. 
  • The Court held that imprisonment has no bearing on whether a defendant has withdrawn from a racketeering conspiracy nor does ceasing to participate in a conspiracy mean a defendant has withdrawn. To withdraw from a RICO conspiracy, a conspirator must act affirmatively. Typical demonstrations of withdrawal include a “full confession or communication of abandonment to one’s co-conspirators.”

What is Required in a Jury’s Verdict to Convict a Defendant of RICO or Racketeering Conspiracy?

FACTS

Rafael Leoner-Aguirre was a member of the El Salvador based gang “MS-13,” which also operates in the United States. In 2017, a grand jury indicted Aguirre for a conspiracy under the RICO Act (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations). Allegations against Aguirre under the RICO conspiracy included attempted murder, robbery, and drug trafficking. A jury found Aguirre guilty of RICO conspiracy and he was sentenced to 228 months in prison with three years of supervised release.

Before his trial, Aguirre urged the district court to instruct the jury to specify which acts it found Aguirre had committed in order to convict him of RICO conspiracy. The district court denied his motion, and Aguirre appealed to the First Circuit.

ANALYSIS

No Findings of Specific Acts of RICO Conspiracy from the Jury are Necessary in a Jury’s Verdict

Aguirre’s argument that the jury must specify which racketeering acts Aguirre committed to convict him of RICO conspiracy relies on the First Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Ramirez-Rivera 800 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2015). However, the Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) contradicts the case on which the Ramirez-Rivera decision relies. Aguirre’s argument, therefore, fails since the Supreme Court’s decision overrules the underlying case in Ramirez-Rivera.

Incarceration Does Not Constitute Withdrawal from a RICO Conspiracy

As to the withdrawal issue, the First Circuit held that a defendant convicted of RICO conspiracy does not withdraw from a conspiracy just because he has entered prison. On the contrary, the Court found there was sufficient evidence to determine that Aguirre continued to actively participate in the conspiracy while incarcerated. As the Court pointed out, “ . . . mere cessation of activity in furtherance of the conspiracy does not constitute withdrawal.” Instead, the defendant must demonstrate he has affirmatively withdrawn from the RICO conspiracy. Although the Court provided no specific rule, it held that affirmative withdrawal from a conspiracy typically “requires either a full confession to authorities or a communication by the accused to his co-conspirators that he has abandoned the enterprise and its goals . . .”

Unconstitutional Federal Statute Calls Supreme Court to Protect Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury

United States v. Haymond

No. 17-1672

U.S. Supreme Court

Decided: June 26, 2019

ISSUE

Whether 18 U.S.C. §3583(k)’s requirement that a district court impose a mandatory minimum prison sentence by a preponderance of the evidence for certain offenses committed during supervised release violates the constitution’s guarantee of a trial by jury. 

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3583(k) is unconstitutional unless the charges can be proven by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Haymond was found guilty of possessing child pornography by a jury and was sentenced to 38 months in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. During his supervised release, the government discovered what appeared to be child pornography on Haymond’s phone. As a result of the violation, the government sought additional incarceration for Haymond.

A district judge found that Haymond knowingly possessed the images depicting child pornography by a proponderence of the evidence. Under 18 U.S.C. §3583(k) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a judge is required to impose a minimum prison sentence of five years where a defendant has violated supervised release by committing certain offenses. Relevant to this case, one of those listed offenses is possession of child pornography. Although reluctant to do so, the district judge imposed the mandatory 5-year sentence.

The Tenth Circuit found that §3583(k) violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, acknowledging that while a jury previously convicted Haymond by a reasonable doubt resulting in a 0-10 year sentence, §3583(k) allowed Haymond to face a higher mandatory minimum only by a judge’s finding of a preponderance of the evidence. This, the Tenth Circuit held, violated Haymond’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. Haymond was resentenced without regard to §3583(k)’s provisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to resolve the question of the statute’s constitutionality.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantee the accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury and due process of law in criminal proceedings in the United States. A jury’s finding of guilt must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Only after a jury finds a defendant guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt may the judge impose a penalty within the range allowed for that offense. The Supreme Court recognizes that “even when judges [enjoy] discretion to adjust a sentence based on judge-found aggravating or mitigating facts, they [cannot] ‘swell the penalty above what the law [provides] for the acts charged.’” 588 U.S. ___ (2019) quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 at 519 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

Here, §3583(k) permits just that. Only as a result of the district judge’s finding of the defendant’s guilt by a preponderance of the evidence is the five-year mandatory minimum imposed. Contrary to the government’s argument, this new sentence was not authorized by the jury’s verdict.

The Supreme Court  already held a similar statutory scheme allowing judges to impose sentences above the allowed maximum unconstitutional. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, a judge sought to impose a longer sentence than the prescribed maximum after a jury trial pursuant to a statute that permitted him to do so under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court held this scheme unconstitutional and later applied the same rule when it held a similar sentence enhancement unconstitutional in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 466.

Section 3583(k) essentially permits district courts to impose a new and potentially harsher punishment for a new offense. By allowing a judge to increase “‘the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences’ [is] in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (quoting Alleyne at 115). The Supreme Court vacated Haymond’s judgment, holding §3583(k) unconstitutional.