Tag Archives: criminal appeal

Protecting the Right to Preserve an Appeal Regardless of Plea Agreement Language

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Garza v. Idaho
No. 17-1026
U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: February 27, 2019

ISSUE

Whether counsel is deemed ineffective where a defendant requests that counsel file a Notice of Appeal and, even in light of a signed  waiver of appeal, defense counsel fails to file the notice of appeal. 

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court held that counsel is ineffective where counsel declines to file a Notice of Appeal at the defendant’s request even where the defendant has signed a waiver of appeal. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Garza signed a waiver of appeal upon pleading guilty to criminal charges in the state of Idaho. Following Garza’s sentencing, he informed counsel that he wished to pursue an appeal. Counsel advised Garza not to appeal because he had signed a waiver of appeal. After the time to file a notice of appeal expired, Garza sought post-conviction relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. The trial court denied relief and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the state court’s decision. Thereafter the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel could not be deemed deficient nor did counsel’s performance prejudice Garza. The Court also held that where a defendant has signed a waiver of appeal, the presumption of prejudice, under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, does not apply. 

COURT’S ANALYSIS

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 set forth a two-prong test a defendant must meet to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel’s performance must be ineffective, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant so much as to have deprived him of a right to a fair trial. However, when counsel’s performance is so ineffective that it “deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken,” prejudice is presumed. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S., at 484.

Commonly included in a defendant’s plea agreement is a waiver of appeal. At face, a defendant has signed away his right to pursue an appeal. However, the Supreme Court recognizes that the waiver does not prevent the defendant from pursuing appellate claims outside the scope of the plea agreement.

As noted in Flores-Ortega, effort on the part of counsel required to file a Notice of Appeal is “purely ministerial” and “imposes no great burden.” 528 U.S., at 474. Whether an appeal is worth pursuing is not up to counsel; the defendant has the “ultimate authority.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751.

Here, Garza’s attorney clearly disregarded his persistent requests to file a notice of appeal when it was not up to counsel to decide. Because Flores-Ortega has determined that a presumption of prejudice applies when a defendant is “denied counsel at a critical stage,” the Court held that a presumption of prejudice also applies when counsel’s ineffectiveness has deprived the defendant of an “appellate proceeding altogether.” 528 U.S., at 483. Therefore Garza’s attorney deprived him from a critical proceeding to which Garza had the right. 

Contrary to the Government’s argument, Garza need not demonstrate that his claims would have won on appeal. The defendant’s right to this procedure overrides any conditions proposed by the Government and, in any case, it would be improper to require a defendant to determine which arguments he would have made on appeal.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision.

government breached plea agreement

Post-Incarceration Supervised Release Tolled During Pre-Conviction Detention

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Mont v. United States
No. 17-8995
U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: June 3, 2019

Issue

Whether a convicted criminal’s period of supervised release is tolled during pretrial detention for a new criminal offense.

Holding

The U.S. Supreme Court held that pretrial incarceration later credited as time served for a new conviction is imprisonment in connection with a new conviction and thus tolls the supervised release term under §3624(e), even if the court does not make the tolling calculation until after the conviction. 

Facts of the Case

While serving a 5-year term of supervised release following a federal prison sentence, petitioner Mont was arrested on state drug charges. At that time, about nine months of supervised release remained. 

Eventually, Mont pled guilty to state charges and admitted to violating his federal supervised release conditions. The state court sentenced Mont to six years’ imprisonment and a few days later the District Court issued a warrant for the supervised release violations after previously declining to do so. By the time Mont was sentenced on the state charges, the original term of his supervised release had expired. Mont argued the District Court had no jurisdiction over him because the federal warrant was issued after his supervised release was set to expire.

The District Court rejected Mont’s argument, ruling that it had jurisdiction under 18 USC §3583(i), and sentenced Mont to an additional 42 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision but on grounds that Mont’s supervised release period had been tolled under §3624(e) while Mont was incarcerated while awaiting sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 

Court’s Analysis

18 U.S.C. §3624(e), under which the District Court based its decision provides:

“. . . A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.”

The Supreme Court has previously recognized that the phrase “in connection with” bears a broad interpretation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006). The Court holds that pretrial detention of a conviction is “in connection with” the conviction. Had Congress intended to preclude pretrial detention, the Court reasoned, it would have used language such as “following a conviction” or “after a conviction.” The use of the language “in connection with a conviction” assumes pretrial incarceration. 

Moreover, the Court recognizes supervised release as a means to facilitate a “transition to community life.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000). Therefore, according to the Court, incarceration should not substitute supervised released and, in this case, Mont’s pretrial detention should not be credited toward his remaining supervised release. Instead, Mont’s supervised release should be tolled as per Congress’s original intent. If supervised release were not tolled, the ultimate purpose of supervised release would be frustrated. By tolling the supervised release by his pretrial detention, the District Court ensures Mont serves five years as a transitional period into a law-abiding life.