Tag Archives: violent felony

Intent for “Remaining-in” Burglary Extends Beyond the Doorway

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Quarles v. United States

No. 17-778

U.S. Supreme Court

Decided June 10, 2019

ISSUE

Whether “remaining-in” burglary occurs only if a person has the intent to commit a crime at the exact moment he or she first unlawfully remains in a building or structure, or whether it occurs when a person forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure.

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court held that “remaining-in” burglary occurs when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in the building or structure.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Quarles pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 992(g)(1) and qualified for enhanced sentencing–a 15 year minimum–under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior “violent felony” convictions under §924(e). 

However, during sentencing, Quarles claimed one of his three prior felony convictions, third degree home invasion, did not qualify as burglary, a violent felony under §924(e), and thus he was not subject to enhanced sentencing. Quarles argued that the Michigan statute, under which he was convicted, was broader than the generic definition of burglary set forth by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575.

The District Court rejected Quarles’ argument and sentenced him to 17 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and the U.S. Supreme Court granted Quarles certiorari.


COURT’S ANALYSIS

The opinion, delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, required the Court to determine whether the Michigan home invasion statute swept too broadly to qualify as generic burglary as set forth by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States. Specifically, this issue called into question whether the intent to commit a crime must take place a) upon first entering or b) at any time the person remains in the building or dwelling to qualify as generic burglary.

Under the Michigan statute, third degree home invasion occurs when a person “breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.110a(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added). In Taylor, the Supreme Court interpreted generic burglary to include “remaining-in” burglary (Taylor at 599), but the question of when the intent must occur remained.

Quarles argued that the intent to commit a crime must occur at the exact moment a person enters a building illegally to constitute burglary under §924(e). Although the Court agreed with this interpretation, it pointed out that Quarles failed to distinguish between a burglary predicated on unlawful entry and a burglary predicated on unlawful remaining. In the latter category, the Court concluded, intent may be formed at any point a person remains in the dwelling or building–not only upon entering. The Court further determined that to exclude the intent to commit a crime while remaining in the structure for purposes of defining generic burglary “would make little sense in light of Congress’ rationale for specifying burglary as a violent felony.”

Generic remaining-in burglary, therefore, occurs when intent is formed at any point a person unlawfully remains in a building or structure. The state law in this case substantially corresponded to generic burglary, and Quarles’ conviction qualified as a violent felony under §924(e) for purposes of enhanced sentencing.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Enhancements and Crimes of Violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act

Published By Stephen Preziosi

U.S. v. Jones

877  F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017)

Decided December 15, 2017

 

Sentencing Enhancement under the ACCA: Arizona Armed Robbery Not a Violent Felony

Issue: Whether Arizona armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA for the purposes of sentencing range enhancements and because the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause, the Arizona armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony only if it meets the requirements of the ACCA’s force clause or enumerated felonies clause.

Holding: Applying the categorical approach and pointing to its recent decision in United States v. Molinar, 2017 WL 5760565, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that armed robbery in Arizona does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA and, therefore, it cannot serve as a predicate violent conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes.

Facts: Jones pled guilty to one count of being a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e). The district court found that Jones was convicted of at least three violent felonies (three were armed robbery convictions) and sentenced him to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA. Jones later filed a § 2255 motion, arguing that he no longer has three qualifying convictions to trigger the ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum sentence. The district court denied Jones’s motion and Jones appealed the district court’s denial.

Analysis: The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Section 924(e), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment on a person who violates Section 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a serious drug offense or a violent felony or some combination of the two.

To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA, we apply the “categorical approach,” looking “only to the fact of conviction” and “the statutory definitions of the prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. A prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if, after “compar[ing] the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood [,] … the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.

United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (C.A.9 (Ariz.), 2017)

 

What is a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines?

Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a “crime of violence” is “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another (the “force clause”), or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives (the “enumerated felonies clause”), or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another (the “residual clause”).

Guidelines manual § 4B1.2(a)

The U.S. Supreme Court has since denounced the “residual clause” of the ACCA as it violates due process and is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2555-57 (2015) (Johnson II). The residual clause states that a felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” should be treated as a “violent felony.

Thus, Jones only needed to demonstrate that Arizona armed robbery meets the requirements of the force clause or the enumerated felonies clause.

 

Is armed robbery in Arizona a violent felony under the ACCA’s “Force Clause”?

In Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), the U.S. Supreme Court defined “violent felony” under the ACCA as a “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Last year, in United States v. Molinar, 2017 WL 5760565, the Ninth Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s “violent felony” definition in Johnson I and held that Arizona’s armed robbery statute “on its face . . . does not require that the robber actually use or even threaten to use a weapon.” Therefore, in Arizona, “armed robbery is indistinguishable from robbery for the categorical analysis under the force clause” and the Molinar panel concluded that Arizona armed robbery can no longer be considered a violent crime under Section 4B1.2’s force clause of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the holding in Molinar “applies equally” to the ACCA’s force clause because it is identical to the Sentencing Guidelines’ force clause. Accordingly, the Court held that Arizona armed robbery is not categorized as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause.

 

Is armed robbery in Arizona a violent felony under the ACCA’s “Enumerated Felonies Clause?”

While the Molinar panel held that Arizona armed robbery was not a violent crime under the Sentencing Guidelines’ “force clause,” it came to a different conclusion with regard to the “enumerated felonies” clause. Though robbery is not listed as an enumerated felony under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the Molinar court looked to the commentary of Section 4B1.2, which specifically states that robbery is a crime of violence. However, the ACCA’s enumerated felonies clause contains no such clarifying commentary and, thus, the commentary in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines does not apply to Jones. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that a previous decision had already determined that robbery is not an enumerated felony under the ACCA. United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015).

Concluding that Arizona armed robbery does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of Jones’s Section 2255 motion.