Tag Archives: supreme court

Unconstitutional Federal Statute Calls Supreme Court to Protect Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury

Published By Stephen Preziosi

United States v. Haymond

No. 17-1672

U.S. Supreme Court

Decided: June 26, 2019

ISSUE

Whether 18 U.S.C. §3583(k)’s requirement that a district court impose a mandatory minimum prison sentence by a preponderance of the evidence for certain offenses committed during supervised release violates the constitution’s guarantee of a trial by jury. 

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 5-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3583(k) is unconstitutional unless the charges can be proven by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Haymond was found guilty of possessing child pornography by a jury and was sentenced to 38 months in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. During his supervised release, the government discovered what appeared to be child pornography on Haymond’s phone. As a result of the violation, the government sought additional incarceration for Haymond.

A district judge found that Haymond knowingly possessed the images depicting child pornography by a proponderence of the evidence. Under 18 U.S.C. §3583(k) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a judge is required to impose a minimum prison sentence of five years where a defendant has violated supervised release by committing certain offenses. Relevant to this case, one of those listed offenses is possession of child pornography. Although reluctant to do so, the district judge imposed the mandatory 5-year sentence.

The Tenth Circuit found that §3583(k) violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, acknowledging that while a jury previously convicted Haymond by a reasonable doubt resulting in a 0-10 year sentence, §3583(k) allowed Haymond to face a higher mandatory minimum only by a judge’s finding of a preponderance of the evidence. This, the Tenth Circuit held, violated Haymond’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. Haymond was resentenced without regard to §3583(k)’s provisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to resolve the question of the statute’s constitutionality.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantee the accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury and due process of law in criminal proceedings in the United States. A jury’s finding of guilt must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Only after a jury finds a defendant guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt may the judge impose a penalty within the range allowed for that offense. The Supreme Court recognizes that “even when judges [enjoy] discretion to adjust a sentence based on judge-found aggravating or mitigating facts, they [cannot] ‘swell the penalty above what the law [provides] for the acts charged.’” 588 U.S. ___ (2019) quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 at 519 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

Here, §3583(k) permits just that. Only as a result of the district judge’s finding of the defendant’s guilt by a preponderance of the evidence is the five-year mandatory minimum imposed. Contrary to the government’s argument, this new sentence was not authorized by the jury’s verdict.

The Supreme Court  already held a similar statutory scheme allowing judges to impose sentences above the allowed maximum unconstitutional. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, a judge sought to impose a longer sentence than the prescribed maximum after a jury trial pursuant to a statute that permitted him to do so under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court held this scheme unconstitutional and later applied the same rule when it held a similar sentence enhancement unconstitutional in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 466.

Section 3583(k) essentially permits district courts to impose a new and potentially harsher punishment for a new offense. By allowing a judge to increase “‘the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences’ [is] in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (quoting Alleyne at 115). The Supreme Court vacated Haymond’s judgment, holding §3583(k) unconstitutional.

Intent for “Remaining-in” Burglary Extends Beyond the Doorway

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Quarles v. United States

No. 17-778

U.S. Supreme Court

Decided June 10, 2019

ISSUE

Whether “remaining-in” burglary occurs only if a person has the intent to commit a crime at the exact moment he or she first unlawfully remains in a building or structure, or whether it occurs when a person forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure.

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court held that “remaining-in” burglary occurs when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in the building or structure.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Quarles pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 992(g)(1) and qualified for enhanced sentencing–a 15 year minimum–under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior “violent felony” convictions under §924(e). 

However, during sentencing, Quarles claimed one of his three prior felony convictions, third degree home invasion, did not qualify as burglary, a violent felony under §924(e), and thus he was not subject to enhanced sentencing. Quarles argued that the Michigan statute, under which he was convicted, was broader than the generic definition of burglary set forth by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575.

The District Court rejected Quarles’ argument and sentenced him to 17 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and the U.S. Supreme Court granted Quarles certiorari.


COURT’S ANALYSIS

The opinion, delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, required the Court to determine whether the Michigan home invasion statute swept too broadly to qualify as generic burglary as set forth by the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States. Specifically, this issue called into question whether the intent to commit a crime must take place a) upon first entering or b) at any time the person remains in the building or dwelling to qualify as generic burglary.

Under the Michigan statute, third degree home invasion occurs when a person “breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.110a(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added). In Taylor, the Supreme Court interpreted generic burglary to include “remaining-in” burglary (Taylor at 599), but the question of when the intent must occur remained.

Quarles argued that the intent to commit a crime must occur at the exact moment a person enters a building illegally to constitute burglary under §924(e). Although the Court agreed with this interpretation, it pointed out that Quarles failed to distinguish between a burglary predicated on unlawful entry and a burglary predicated on unlawful remaining. In the latter category, the Court concluded, intent may be formed at any point a person remains in the dwelling or building–not only upon entering. The Court further determined that to exclude the intent to commit a crime while remaining in the structure for purposes of defining generic burglary “would make little sense in light of Congress’ rationale for specifying burglary as a violent felony.”

Generic remaining-in burglary, therefore, occurs when intent is formed at any point a person unlawfully remains in a building or structure. The state law in this case substantially corresponded to generic burglary, and Quarles’ conviction qualified as a violent felony under §924(e) for purposes of enhanced sentencing.