Tag Archives: fifth amendment

Separate Sovereigns Doctrine: State and Federal Prosecutions for Same Conduct Deemed Constitutional

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Gamble v. United States
No. 17-646
U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: June 17, 2019

ISSUE

Whether the separate sovereigns doctrine or dual sovereigns doctrine is unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment where the federal government charges a defendant with a federal offense for possession of a weapon when the defendant has already pleaded guilty to a State Penal Law offense stemming from possession of the same weapon.     

HOLDING

The U.S. Supreme Court declined to overturn the separate sovereigns doctrine and held: a) the separate sovereigns doctrine does not implicate the double jeopardy clause and b) the same conduct prosecuted by different sovereigns does not constitute the same offense as in a case of double jeopardy.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In 2015, petitioner Gamble was charged with violating state drug laws and Alabama’s felon in possession of a firearm statute. The federal government stepped in the prosecute Gamble for the same act–felon in possession of a firearm–but under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).

Gamble moved to dismiss, arguing that the federal and state firearm indictments violated the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment because each indicted him for the same “offence”. The District Court denied Gamble’s motion under the ground that prosecutions by different sovereigns are not prosecutions for the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.

Gamble pled guilty to the federal offense but preserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The denial of his subsequent appeal to the Eleventh Circuit again cited the dual-sovereignty doctrine. Gamble asked the Supreme Court to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine and the Court granted certiorari.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The opinion, delivered by Justice Alito, began by addressing the common misconception that the separate sovereigns doctrine is an “exception” to the double jeopardy clause. However, the Court pointed out, the double jeopardy clause “ . . .protects individuals from being put twice in jeopardy ‘for the same offence’, not for the same conduct or actions,” thus removing any relevance between double jeopardy exposure and separate sovereigns prosecution. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990). The separate sovereigns doctrine doesn’t allow for someone to be convicted of the “same offense” because an offense under the federal law and an offense under a state law is not the “same offense.”

The analysis continued by explaining that “offenses” are defined by laws; since sovereigns have their own set of laws, they also have their own set of offenses. In this instance, according to the Court, though Gamble’s conduct–being a felon in possession of a firearm–was indistinguishable, each offense for which Gamble was indicted, as a result of the conduct, were driven by distinct laws of the state of Alabama and the federal government. 

Gamble also urged the Court to consider that the history behind the ratification of the double jeopardy clause is contrary to the Court’s previous rulings, which have continued to uphold the separate sovereigns doctrine. While Gamble argues the Supreme Court should overrule this line of decisions, the Court held that Gamble failed to provide a sufficient reason to do so and his backing of historical evidence was unconvincing. Even if the Court did credit Gamble’s historical argument, they held that a departure from established precedent “demands special justification” that is “something more than ambiguous historical evidence.”

Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion joins in maintaining the separate sovereigns doctrine but departs from the majority in one key part. Stare decisis, according to Justice Thomas, has no place in swaying the opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. As Justice Thomas puts it bluntly – “[w]hen faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule is simply: We should not follow it.” 

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg looks at the separate sovereigns doctrine from the point of view of the individual rather than the government. Justice Ginsburg asserts that the Double Jeopardy Clause “safeguards the person and restrains the government.” Allowing the state and federal government to engage in successive prosecutions flies in the face of what Ginsburg claims is the purpose of our system of government–to “operate as a double security for the rights of the people.” She would have the majority hold that the unlike foreign nations, the United States and its constituent states are “parts of one whole” which compose one people, and that the Federal and State Governments should be disabled from accomplishing together what neither government could do alone–prosecute an ordinary citizen twice for the same offense.

Throw-Back-Thursday: The Fifth Amendment’s Right to Remain Silent and Miranda v. Arizona

Published By Stephen Preziosi

Miranda v. Arizona

86 S.Ct 1602

US Supreme Court

Decided June 13, 1966

 

Throw-Back-Thursdays wouldn’t be complete without this great Supreme Court classic: The most recognizable legal incantation known throughout the country: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney.” derives from the landmark case known as Miranda v. Arizona. It is so often repeated on television, in the movies, and in real life that it has become part of our culture. The right not to incriminate oneself (often referred to as the right to remain silent) stems from the Fifth Amendment to our Constitution. But how and when were law enforcement officers required to recite the Miranda warnings to arrestees? The birth of the iconic Miranda rights dates back to 1966, when the Supreme Court made a landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona.

Ernesto Miranda and the Story Behind the Miranda Rights

Three years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona after law enforcement connected him to a kidnapping and rape. The officers questioned him for two hours until Miranda signed a confession. Miranda was never informed of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney, nor was he informed of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.

At trial, Miranda’s lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected when prosecutors attempted to offer his written confession as evidence. Moore argued that Miranda’s confession could not have been voluntary because he was never informed of his rights and that the confession should be precluded from being introduced as evidence. The judge overruled Moore’s objection and Miranda was convicted of the rape and kidnapping charges. Moore appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court but the conviction was affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision relied heavily on the notion that Miranda did not take the initiative to request an attorney himself.

The Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court

Justice Earl Warren delivered the 5-4 majority opinion, with Justices Harlan and White dissenting and Justice Clark concurring and dissenting in part. The Court ruled that the prosecution may not use statements made by an individual during custodial interrogation unless certain safeguards were followed. This decision guaranteed that individuals received notice that they had a right, under the Fifth Amendment, against self-incrimination—a notice that became known as Miranda warnings.

Throughout the decision, the Court highlighted the importance of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, noting that “the current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not incriminate himself.” Another crucial observation made by the Court was that police officers have the advantage during custodial interrogation and that the liberty of the individual being interrogated is often compromised because of this position of power.

Previously, courts had to decide whether defendants understood their constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. Because the right against self-incrimination was so essential to the justice system, the Court held that this methodology was not enough. In an effort ensure all defendants understand their fundamental constitutional rights upon being arrested and before being interrogated in custody, the Supreme Court held that police must make defendants aware of these rights. From that point on, law enforcement was required to warn defendants of the following: 1) the right to remain silent; 2) that anything they say may be used against them in court; 3) the right to an attorney, either retained by them or appointed by the court; and 4) that they may waive these rights, but they retain the right to ask for an attorney any time during the interrogation, at which point the interrogation can only continue in the presence of a lawyer.

Notably, this decision was quite controversial, which isn’t surprising considering the 5-4 split. Those who criticized the decision argued that the new guidelines would weaken law enforcement’s ability to catch criminals. Even as late as 2000, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, but the majority concluded that the Miranda warnings have “become part of our national culture” and refused to overrule the decision.