Sentence Reduction and the Compassionate Release Statute

US v Andrews

No. 20-2768

Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided on August 30, 2021

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Issue:

Entitlement to Compassionate Release

Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant Andrews’ motion for compassionate release based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), where Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for thirteen armed robberies committed when he was nineteen.

Holding:

Compassionate Release requires “Extraordinary and Compelling” Reasons

The Third Circuit held that 1) the District Court did not err in denying Andrews’ motion for compassionate release because his reasons fell short of the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons requirement, and 2) courts wield considerable discretion in granting such motions.

Facts:

In 2005 defendant Eric Andrews robbed thirteen North Philadelphia businesses at gunpoint. Andrews was charged with the robberies, conspiring to commit the robberies, and brandishing a firearm during the completed crimes. A jury found Andrews guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to 312 years’ imprisonment: 57 months for the robberies and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and 3,684 months for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Andrews received such a sentence because, at the time, each additional § 924(c) count carried a 25-year mandatory minimum.

With the First Step Act of 2008, Congress revised § 924(c) so that the 25-year mandatory minimum for subsequent offenses would not apply unless the defendant already had a final conviction for a § 924(c) charge at the time of the offense. Had Andrews been sentenced after 2008, his consecutive convictions for brandishing a firearm would generate a statutory minimum of 7 years each, resulting in a 91-year sentence. But Congress did not make the statutory change retroactive, so Andrews was not entitled to a reduced sentence. He was, however, entitled to move for a modified sentence via compassionate release. In his support of his motion, Andrews pointed to the recent changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums as well his rehabilitation in prison, his young age at the time of his offense, the government’s decision to charge him with thirteen § 924(c) counts, and his alleged susceptibility to COVID-19. Defendant claimed that these reasons were “extraordinary and compelling” reasons under the compassionate release statute. The District Court disagreed, denying Andrews’ motion.

Analysis:

Compassionate Release is a “Purely Discretionary Decision”

The Third Circuit reiterated that courts wield considerable discretion in compassionate release cases, and it will not disturb a court’s determination unless left with a “definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” (US v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 440 [2020]). The Court explained that a grant of compassionate release is “a purely discretionary decision.” Therefore, in determining whether the District Court abused its discretion, the Third Circuit reviewed the court’s decision under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

Definition of “Extraordinary and Compelling”

A prisoner’s motion for compassionate release may be granted if the court finds that the sentence reduction is 1) warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; 2) “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and 3) supported by the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable.

Before the District Court could consider whether defendant’s proposed reasons collectively satisfied the “extraordinary and compelling” requirement, it first had to determine the meaning of the phrase under the statute. Commission policy describes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” as: 1) medical conditions, 2) complications in old age, 3) family circumstances, and 4) “other reasons” as determined by the Directer of the Bureau of Prisons. But the court concluded that this policy statement applies only to Bureau-initiated motions and is inapplicable to prisoner-initiated motions. Furthermore, the court held that is was free to interpret the phrase for itself and consider reasons beyond the four categories listed in the policy statement.

Defendant’s Reasons for Compassionate Release Fall Short of Requirement

The District Court concluded, then, that two of the proposed reasons—the duration of defendant’s sentence and the non-retroactive changes to mandatory minimums—could not be extraordinary and compelling as a matter of law. The duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or compelling circumstance, and the First Step Act’s changes to the § 924(c) statute did not apply to people who had already been sentenced. “There is nothing ‘extraordinary’ about leaving untouched the exact penalties that Congress prescribed and that a district court imposed for particular violations of a statute.” (United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021)). “Indeed, the imposition of a sentence that was not only permissible but statutorily required at the time is neither an extraordinary nor a compelling reason to now reduce that same sentence.” (United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 838 (10th Cir. 2021)).

Regarding the other reasons included in defendant’s motion, the District Court held that they, too, fell short of the extraordinary and compelling requirement. The court recognized that Andrews was arrested at nineteen and has made great strides in his rehabilitation in prison, but that his other reasons—susceptibility to COVID-19 and the Government’s decision to charge him with thirteen firearm counts—weighed against him because he presented no facts showing that prosecutors abused their discretion and he provided insufficient details about his susceptibility to COVID-19.

The Third Circuit therefore found no clear errors of judgment, and it affirmed the District Court’s order denying defendant’s motion for compassionate release.