• Dunaway v. New York: Fourth Amendment Violation As Basis To Suppress Statements Despite Miranda Warnings

    Published By Stephen Preziosi

    Dunaway v. New York

    U.S. Supreme Court

    442 U.S. 200 (1979)

    Decided on June 5, 1979

    Throw-Back-Thursday Blog Post.

    This week we consider another classic in the criminal law arena:  Dunaway v. New York was decided in light of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590.  The Court’s finding would, like Mapp, transform the way we do business on a daily basis in criminal courts throughout the United States.  Reading through the Court’s analysis again was a refreshing reminder of the parameters of the Dunaway hearings and the rule of admissibility of statements in light of a Fourth Amendment violation despite the police administering Miranda warnings.

    Issue: whether statements and sketches that were taken at a police station must be suppressed because of the unlawful detention of the defendant where he was brought to the police station and interrogated and whether the illegal detention was sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of the statements at trial.

    Holding: The U.S. Supreme Court held that when police unconstitutionally seize and detain an individual for interrogation without probable cause, statements made by that individual must be suppressed regardless of giving proper Miranda warnings or voluntariness in the Fifth Amendment sense. Law enforcement may not violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the procedural safeguards of the Fifth.

    Facts: A Rochester, New York detective questioned an inmate at a jail who allegedly had information about an attempted robbery and homicide in which the detective believed petitioner Dunaway was involved. Although the information was not enough for an arrest warrant, Dunaway was taken into custody where he was interrogated. He was told that if he attempted to leave, he would be physically restrained.

    After being read his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and supplied the detectives with self-incriminating statements and illustrations. Before trial, Dunaway moved to have the self-incriminating evidence suppressed, but the motion was denied and Dunaway was convicted.

    The Rule In Brown v. Illinois

    The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the conviction in light of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), where the Supreme Court held that there is no per se rule that Miranda warnings provide a cure-all for Fourth Amendment violations when incriminating statements result from custodial interrogation following an arrest on less than probable cause. The trial court granted Dunaway’s motion to suppress on remand, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Appellate Division reasoned that even if police lack probable cause for an arrest, they could still detain an individual under reasonable suspicion for questioning under “carefully controlled” conditions that do not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

    The petitioner in Brown, like petitioner Dunaway, made inculpatory statements after receiving Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation following his seizure—in that case a formal arrest—on less than probable cause. Brown’s motion to suppress the statements was also denied and the statements were used to convict him. Although the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that Brown’s arrest was unlawful, it affirmed the admission of the statements on the ground that the giving of Miranda warnings served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements. This Court reversed, holding that the Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves sufficed to cure the Fourth Amendment violation; rather the Court held that in order to use such statements, the prosecution must show not only that the statements meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also that the causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is broken sufficiently to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.

    The Case Was Remanded To The New York Court of Appeals And Then To The Trial Court 

    In compliance with the remand, the New York Court of Appeals directed the Monroe County Court to make further factual findings.

    On remand, the County Court in Rochester held that the factual predicate in this case did not amount to probable cause sufficient to support the arrest of the defendant and that the Miranda warnings by themselves did not purge the taint of the defendant’s illegal seizure, and granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division reversed finding that the taint of the illegal detention was sufficiently attenuated to allow the admission of his statements and sketches, emphasizing that the petitioner was never threatened or abused by the police. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for leave to appeal and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

    Analysis: Just four years prior, the Supreme Court decided that the Miranda warning is not a cure-all for Fourth Amendment violations when incriminating statements result from custodial interrogation following an arrest on less than probable cause. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The Brown Court further ruled that for such obtained statements to be admissible, the prosecution would need to prove that those statements met voluntariness standards under the Fifth Amendment and that they were “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint” in light of the Fourth Amendment.

    Miranda Warnings Were Proper

    Although in agreement that there was no probable cause, the State purported that Dunaway’s seizure did not amount to an arrest and that because police had “reasonable suspicion,” questioning was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that while no “arrest” technically took place, the way the detectives treated Dunaway was indistinguishable from an official arrest, which amounted to an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

    The New York courts have consistently held, and petitioner does not contest, that proper Miranda warnings were given and that his statements were “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. But Brown v. Illinois, supra, settled that [t]he exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth,” 422 U.S., at 601, 95 S.Ct., at 2260, and held therefore that “Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.” Ibid.

    Miranda Does Not Attenuate The Fourth Amendment Violation 

    “If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. . . . Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or ‘investigation,’ would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings.” Id., at 602, 95 S.Ct., at 2261.

    Consequently, although a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,18 this type of “voluntariness” is merely a “threshold requirement” for Fourth Amendment analysis, 422 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct., at 2262. Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached.

    The Test From Brown v. Illinois

    Beyond this threshold requirement, Brown articulated a test designed to vindicate the “distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.

    When there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts.

    Brown identified several factors to be considered “in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest[:t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct . . . . And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.

    No intervening events broke the connection between petitioner’s illegal detention and his confession. To admit petitioner’s confession in such a case would allow “law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the ‘procedural safeguards’ of the Fifth.

    The Supreme Court looked to the exclusionary rule, which prohibits unconstitutionally obtained evidence from being used in state and federal court, and determined that even when Miranda warnings are given and statements are voluntarily under the Fifth Amendment, if an individual was seized illegally under the Fourth Amendment, the elicited statements resulting from the custodial interrogation must be suppressed.

  • U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Enhancements and Crimes of Violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act

    Published By Stephen Preziosi

    U.S. v. Jones

    877  F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017)

    Decided December 15, 2017

     

    Sentencing Enhancement under the ACCA: Arizona Armed Robbery Not a Violent Felony

    Issue: Whether Arizona armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA for the purposes of sentencing range enhancements and because the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause, the Arizona armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony only if it meets the requirements of the ACCA’s force clause or enumerated felonies clause.

    Holding: Applying the categorical approach and pointing to its recent decision in United States v. Molinar, 2017 WL 5760565, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that armed robbery in Arizona does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA and, therefore, it cannot serve as a predicate violent conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes.

    Facts: Jones pled guilty to one count of being a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e). The district court found that Jones was convicted of at least three violent felonies (three were armed robbery convictions) and sentenced him to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA. Jones later filed a § 2255 motion, arguing that he no longer has three qualifying convictions to trigger the ACCA’s fifteen-year minimum sentence. The district court denied Jones’s motion and Jones appealed the district court’s denial.

    Analysis: The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Section 924(e), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment on a person who violates Section 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a serious drug offense or a violent felony or some combination of the two.

    To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA, we apply the “categorical approach,” looking “only to the fact of conviction” and “the statutory definitions of the prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. A prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if, after “compar[ing] the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood [,] … the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.

    United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884, 887 (C.A.9 (Ariz.), 2017)

     

    What is a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines?

    Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a “crime of violence” is “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that

    (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another (the “force clause”), or

    (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives (the “enumerated felonies clause”), or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another (the “residual clause”).

    Guidelines manual § 4B1.2(a)

    The U.S. Supreme Court has since denounced the “residual clause” of the ACCA as it violates due process and is unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2555-57 (2015) (Johnson II). The residual clause states that a felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” should be treated as a “violent felony.

    Thus, Jones only needed to demonstrate that Arizona armed robbery meets the requirements of the force clause or the enumerated felonies clause.

     

    Is armed robbery in Arizona a violent felony under the ACCA’s “Force Clause”?

    In Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), the U.S. Supreme Court defined “violent felony” under the ACCA as a “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Last year, in United States v. Molinar, 2017 WL 5760565, the Ninth Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s “violent felony” definition in Johnson I and held that Arizona’s armed robbery statute “on its face . . . does not require that the robber actually use or even threaten to use a weapon.” Therefore, in Arizona, “armed robbery is indistinguishable from robbery for the categorical analysis under the force clause” and the Molinar panel concluded that Arizona armed robbery can no longer be considered a violent crime under Section 4B1.2’s force clause of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

    Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the holding in Molinar “applies equally” to the ACCA’s force clause because it is identical to the Sentencing Guidelines’ force clause. Accordingly, the Court held that Arizona armed robbery is not categorized as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause.

     

    Is armed robbery in Arizona a violent felony under the ACCA’s “Enumerated Felonies Clause?”

    While the Molinar panel held that Arizona armed robbery was not a violent crime under the Sentencing Guidelines’ “force clause,” it came to a different conclusion with regard to the “enumerated felonies” clause. Though robbery is not listed as an enumerated felony under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the Molinar court looked to the commentary of Section 4B1.2, which specifically states that robbery is a crime of violence. However, the ACCA’s enumerated felonies clause contains no such clarifying commentary and, thus, the commentary in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines does not apply to Jones. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that a previous decision had already determined that robbery is not an enumerated felony under the ACCA. United States v. Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015).

    Concluding that Arizona armed robbery does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of Jones’s Section 2255 motion.

     

     

     

  • Mapp v. Ohio: The Origin of The Exclusionary Rule In State Courts

    Published By Stephen Preziosi

    The “Throw Back Thursday” Blog: Examining classic cases that continue to be relevant.

     

    In my first “Throw-Back-Thursday” blog issue, I take the reader back to the ultimate classic in criminal law, to what is probably the most earth-shattering opinion in criminal law decided in the twentieth century, which is still applicable and going strong in the criminal courts today throughout the United States.  If there is any one case that has had more influence and generated more change in the way criminal cases are handled in state courts throughout the United States, it must be Mapp v. Ohio.  I am sure that we are all familiar with the holding in general, but here is a refresher on the case in this week’s Throw-Back-Thursday Blog.

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  • The No-Impeachment Rule Concerning Jury Deliberations: Racial Bias Is Sufficient Reason To Breach The Sanctity Of The Juror Deliberations And Challenge The Basis Of The Verdict.

    Published By Stephen Preziosi

    Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado

    Decided March 6, 2017

    137 S.Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107

    The No-Impeachment Rule Concerning Jury Deliberations: Racial Bias Is Sufficient Reason To Breach The Sanctity Of The Juror Deliberations And Challenge The Basis Of The Verdict.

     

    Issue: Whether an exception to the federal no-impeachment rule applies when a juror makes a statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes to convict a defendant.

    Holding: When a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.

    Facts: Petitioner was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment by a Colorado jury.

    Read More →