Jae Lee v. US

U.S. Supreme Court

No. 16-327

Decided June 23, 2017

Guilty Pleas Resulting from Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Courts Should Look to Defendants’ Expressed Preferences, not Likelihood of Conviction at Trial

Issue: Whether courts should consider strong evidence of guilt for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington when a longtime resident of the United States wishes to vacate his guilty plea after learning the plea subjected him to mandatory deportation.

Holding: The Supreme Court of the United States held that when a defendant claims in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. The Court concluded that lower courts need not consider a defendant’s chances of winning had he gone to trial but, rather, how the error affected the defendant’s decision-making.
Facts: Defendant Jae Lee was convicted of one count of possession ecstasy with intent to distribute. Lee was not a U.S. citizen but had lived in the U.S. most of his life and feared that a criminal conviction might get him deported. Lee alleged he asked his attorney several times whether he would be deported if he took a plea. His attorney urged him not to go to trial because his defense was weak and advised him that if he pleaded guilty, he would not be deported. Lee, with no real defense, accepted the plea. After learning he was subject to mandatory deportation, Lee urged the court to vacate his conviction on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right of effective assistance of counsel. Lee stated that deportation was the determining factor in taking a plea.

Magistrate Judge recommended the plea be set aside and his conviction vacated but the District Court denied relief. District Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge that Lee’s counsel was ineffective, but said Lee’s claim failed the second part of the two-part test in Strickland v Washington in that Lee was not prejudiced by his counsel’s advice. The District Court concluded that Lee “would have almost certainly” been found guilty and received deportation anyway if Lee had gone to trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling.

Analysis: Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 694, to show a defendant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if not for counsel’s error.

Whether Lee’s counsel was ineffective was not in dispute—all parties conceded to this. However, the question that remained before the Supreme Court was whether Lee showed he was prejudiced by his attorney’s erroneous advice. In Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, when a defendant claims his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Hill v. Lockhart does not ask how the trial would have played out, but rather it only considers if the defendant would have opted for trial had the error not occurred. The Supreme Court noted that “when a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient performance led him to accept a guilty plea rather that go to trial” the outcome of “judicial proceedings that never took place” cannot be presumed.

Here, Lee insisted that he would have taken his chances and gone to trial, even if it meant risking more jail time, had he known deportation would have been mandatory as a result of a guilty plea. The Government made the assumption that since Lee had no viable defense he probably would have lost at trial and would have been subject to deportation anyway. Based on this per se rule, the Government alleged that Lee could not show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.

The Supreme Court pointed out two problems with the Government’s application of the per se rule to Lee’s case: 1) this inquiry demands a case by case examination of the totality of the evidence and 2) it overlooks that the Hill v. Lockhart inquiry focuses on defendant’s decision-making, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial. The Supreme Court concluded that “even the smallest chance of success at trial may look attractive” to the defendant, and as Lee alleged, avoiding deportation was the most important factor in his decision, even if it meant risking more prison time by going to trial.

To clarify, the Supreme Court maintains, “courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Instead, courts should “look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.”

Given Lee asked his attorney repeatedly whether he would be deported and the determining factor of his plea was deportation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Lee adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had he known about the mandatory deportation.