Rehaif v. U.S.

139 S. Ct. 2191

Decided on June 21, 2019

Issue:

Prosecuting Unlawful Possession of Firearm

Whether the Government must prove that defendant Rehaif knowingly violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits unlawful aliens from possessing a firearm by proving that 1) he knew that he possessed a firearm and 2) he knew his immigration status as unlawful alien after his student visa had been terminated when he was dismissed from university, and he did not re-enroll or leave the country.

Holding:

Mens Rea Requirement

The Supreme Court held that prosecutions under § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2) require the Government to prove 1) that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and 2) that he knew his status as an illegal immigrant barred him from possessing a firearm.

Facts:

Hamid Rehaif entered the U.S. on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend university. After he received poor grades, the university dismissed him and told him that his “immigration status” would be terminated unless he transferred to a different university or left the country. Rehaif then started visiting a firing range and staying at a hotel where he “demanded a room…facing the airport.” Each morning he checked out and paid his bill with cash. A hotel employee told the FBI that Rehaif claimed to have weapons in his room. He was arrested and charged under § 922(g) for possession of a firearm as an alien unlawfully in the U.S. A separate provision, § 924(a)(2) adds that anyone who “knowingly violates’ the first provision shall be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years.

At the trial’s closing, the judge instructed the jury that the “United States is not required to prove” that Rehaif  “knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the U.S.” He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.  Rehaif appealed, arguing that the judge erred in instructing the jury that it did not need to find that he knew he was in the country unlawfully. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the jury instruction was correct, and it affirmed Rehaif’s conviction.

Analysis:

Scienter Presumption

Whether a criminal statute requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional intent. In determining Congress’ intent, the Supreme Court starts from a presumption traceable to the common law that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding “each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct” (U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 513 U.S.  64, 72, 115 S. Ct. 464, 130 L. Ed .2d 372 (1994)). The Court characterizes this interpretive maxim as a presumption in favor of “scienter,” meaning that criminal statutes require the degree of knowledge sufficient to “make a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act of omission.” Scienter requirements help to “separate those who understand the wrongful nature of their act from those who do not” (Id. at 72-73).

Statutory Language Specifies ‘Knowingly’

The Court does not depart from the ordinary presumption of scienter here. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) states that “whoever knowingly violates” certain subsections of § 922, including § 922(g) shall be subject to penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 922 (g) states that it “shall be unlawful for any person…being an alien…illegally or unlawfully in the U.S.” to “possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” The term “knowingly” modifies the verb “violates” and its direct object, which is in this case § 922(g). As a “matter of ordinary English grammar,” we normally read the statutory term “knowingly” as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime,” (Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., tty U.S. 646, 650, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009)). Thus, the term “knowingly” applies to the statute’s possession element, as well as the status element. The Court held that the Government is therefore required to establish that the defendant knew he violated the material elements of the statute.

‘Knowing’ = Requisite Mental State

The Government argued that whether an alien is unlawfully in the U.S. is a question of law, not fact, and thus appeals to the well-known maxim that “ignorance of the law” is no excuse. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112, L.Ed.2d 617 (1991)).  The Court held, however, that this maxim applies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in respect to the elements of the crime but claims to be “unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct” (1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a), p. 575 (1986)). In contrast, the maxim does not apply where a defendant has a mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of some collateral matter and that mistake results in his misunderstanding the full significance of his conduct,” thereby negating an element of the offense.

The defendant’s status as an alien “illegally or unlawfully in the United States,” refers to a legal matter, but this legal matter is a “collateral” question of law. A defendant who does not know that he is an alien unlawfully in the U.S. does not have the guilty state of mind that the statute’s language and purposes require.

The Court therefore concludes that in order to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possession. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.