Compassionate Release Motions and the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement

United States v. Saladino

No. 20-1563

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided on August 4, 2021

Issue:

 Whether the district court erred in denying defendant Anthony Saladino’s motion for compassionate release due to the threat of COVID-19 where he did not first satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and whether administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied before a district court can entertain a motion for compassionate release.

Holding:

Administrative Exhaustion Requirement is Not Jurisdictional, can be Waived or Forfeited by Government

The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to be heard on the merits and held that the administrative exhaustion requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited, and not a jurisdictional requirement on a court’s authority to consider a motion for compassionate release.

Contact a Federal Criminal Appeals Lawyer to review your case: 1-800-APPEALS (1-800-277-3257)

Facts:

In April 2020, Saladino filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that given his medical condition, the threat of COVID-19 justified his early release from prison. At the hearing on the motion before the district court, Saladino admitted that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by statute. Instead, he asked the district court to excuse his failure to exhaust. The district court denied Saladino’s motion because he “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which are non-waivable.”

Analysis:

The Court found that the district court erred where it intended to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Saladino’s motion due to his failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. A rule is jurisdictional “if the Legislature clearly states that a prescription counts as jurisdictional.” (Fort Bend Cnty v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2019)). But when Congress does not rank a prescription as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non-jurisdictional in character.

Compassionate Release Statute

The statute governing an inmate’s motion for compassionate release reads:  “ A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it as been imposed except that – A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment [subject to certain conditions].” (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Since the language does not provide a clear statement setting forth a jurisdictional prescription, the Second Circuit concluded that that the exhaustion requirement is a “claim-processing rule” and, accordingly, “may be waived or forfeited” by the government. (Hamer v Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 138 S. Ct. 12, 17, (2017)).

The Court explained that district courts in the circuit have split on how to interpret the statute’s provision permitting an inmate to move for a sentence reduction “after…the lapse of 30 days from the receipt” by the warden of an inmate’s request for the BOP to move on his behalf. Some courts have held that the provision authorizes an inmate to file a motion only after he has “waited 30 days from the Warden’s receipt of his request for compassionate release without receiving a response. (United States v Samuels, No. 08-CR-789-6, 2020 WL 7696004, at *3(S.D.N.Y Dec. 28, 2020)). But if the BOP timely responds to the inmate’s request for compassionate release, the inmate must “‘satisfy the same exhaustion procedure’ that applies to ‘routine administrative grievances,’” which would “include appeals to both the appropriate Regional Director and the BOP General Counsel. (Id.)

Other district courts, however, have held that the statute’s 30-day waiting period authorizes the inmate’s filing a motion regardless of whether the warden responds to the inmate’s request for compassionate release. Under this view, an inmate must “either…exhaust administrative remedies or simply…wait 30 days after serving his petition on the warden of his facility before filing a motion in court.” (United States v. Haney, 454 F. Supp. 3d 316, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

While the Second Circuit did not directly address the question of interpretation, it reiterated that the exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule and may be waived or forfeited. It vacated the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to consider Saladinos’s motion on its merits.

For Appeals in New York State Courts click here to contact a New York Criminal Appeals Lawyer